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This study analyzes political, cultural, and social factors that influence
democratization using Hong Kong as a case study. Hong Kong is a transitional society
which provides a unique set of political and social characteristics for which to study
democratic transition. Additionally, reports of political repression from the 2004
Legislative Council election have possibly created a crisis for the democratization
process.
Drawing from existing literature in theories of democratization, political
repression and Hong Kong politics several hypotheses were developed. It was
hypothesized that unchecked hegemonic deterrence, antidemocratic elites, and a weak
political culture have contributed to a lack of democratization. Furthermore, it was
hypothesized that political repression has also contributed to Hong Kong’s lack of
democratization. The relationships between unchecked hegemonic deterrence, antidemocratic elites, and weak political repression in limiting democratization were upheld.

However, the link between political repression and lack of democratization was not
supported due to insufficient evidence.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Democratization has been a difficult issue for the citizens of Hong Kong and the
Chinese government. While the British government made a half-hearted attempt to
democratize Hong Kong before1997, their efforts were marginalized once Hong Kong
reverted to Chinese rule. The Basic Law, the mini-constitution upon which Hong Kong is
governed, calls for full universal suffrage, but does not set a timetable as to when this is
to be accomplished. Thus, democratization may be held at bay indefinitely under this
agreement.
When analyzing political movements, such as democratization, it is important to
identify factors that support or hinder the democratization process. In a situation like
Hong Kong’s in which democratic reform has been hindered, it is through the
understanding of cultural and political factors that democratic reform can be furthered.
This study attempts to follow such a path.
For a political process as important as democratization it is imperative to identify
any practices associated with the campaign for or against the movement. By identifying
those practices, problematic transitions can be diagnosed and addressed. As the pressure
for universal suffrage grows within Hong Kong, the attempts by Beijing to suppress
democratization have increased, especially since the 2003 summer protests. This pressure
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has led Beijing to employ various tactics of political repression to stifle the
democratization movement.
Hong Kong’s democratization movement is rapidly approaching a crisis. While
the reforms that were enacted to elect half of Legislative Council (LegCo) representatives
by geographical constituencies was a step in the right direction, Hong Kong has
continued to sit on the verge of democratization. Existing literature shows that Hong
Kong has all of the necessary factors for a successful democratization, however that
change has not happened yet. It is likely that those who drive the democratization
movement, the middle class, will become disillusioned with the lack of progress.
Furthermore, if a large percentage of voters are being coerced into voting for pro-Beijing
candidates, then the existing semi-democratic system is at risk and the democratization
process is in jeopardy. A Hong Kong with less economic, political, and social freedoms
could damage its economic performance and that of the global economy as well.
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect that international politics,
societal elites, political culture, and political repression have on democratization using
Hong Kong as a case study. This study is an extension of the existing research and will
begin by briefly covering the existing body of knowledge concerning democratization,
the importance of free and fair elections, and Hong Kong’s political environment.
Additionally, this study will offer multiple hypotheses to theorize about the lack of
democratization in Hong Kong and bring together the evidence supporting those
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Democracy is a political system in which its most influential policy makers are
chosen through direct and equal elections, in which the vast majority of the population
has the opportunity to participate (Huntington, 1991). Several different paths to
democratization exist, according to Huntington. The single cause path of democratization
is caused by an external event, such as the rise of a new superpower or an event like
WWII. Parallel development is characterized by democratization when different
countries reach a certain economic threshold; for example a certain gross national product
(GNP) or level of educational obtainment. Snowballing democratization is evident when
one nation becomes a democracy and others around it do so as well, also known as the
domino effect. Finally, prevailing nostrum is the term to define the path when
democratization is used as a cure all for what ails a nation, whether it is an unfavorable
economy or an international crisis (Huntington, 1991).
With the democratization wave that began in the late 1970s, Huntington outlines
five characteristics that were evident. First, the nations in democratic transition
experienced a loss of legitimacy coupled with economic growth, support from the
Catholic Church for individual liberties grew, surrounding hegemonic powers came to
promote democratic rights, and the snowballing effect was evident. Most importantly for
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this study Huntington examines the relationship between economic development and
democratization. He notes several studies in which the positive relationship between
wealth and democracy was upheld (Lipset, 1959; Bollen and Jackman, 1985).
Furthermore, nations that are in the middle level of economic development are the most
likely to democratize while the rich nations already have (Huntington, 1991).
Democratization movements are not driven by societal elites or the lower classes,
but by those in the middle class (Huntington, 1991). In Asian nations like the Philippines
and Korea, middle class led and benefited from democratization while in nations such as
China and Burma, where little or no middle class existed, democracy failed to take root.
In many of these cases the middle class originally supported the authoritarian government
that produced the stability and economy needed for democratization. However, as their
financial disposition rose, the middle class changed its support in favor of democracy
(Huntington, 1991). This change can be attributed to the link between economic progress
and increases in educational attainment, as has been first elaborated by Lipset (1959).
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that more attention is directed towards postmaterialistic ideals like democracy in an economically developed society (Huntington,
1991). The direction of Huntington’s theories and observations support the idea that a
strong economy and stable political environment precedes democratization.
Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959) theory that economic development is the most
important factor in democratization is a popular school of thought in the debate of the
determinants of democratization. This theory of economic development has also become
known as the modernization theory. Wealthy nations typically possess characteristics
such as high levels of education, high levels of industry, and a higher degree of political
4

participation; characteristics that are an integral part of democratization (Lipset, 1959).
Robert Dahl’s theory that decentralized economies are more likely to produce
democracies is notable because Hong Kong’s economy has constantly been rated as the
most free in the world. However, support for this theory often comes from marginally
significant findings, the disregarding of deviant cases and the lack of knowledge over the
true direction of the relationship (Zarate, 1994).
Although the above literature describing the relationship between economic
development and democratization provides a basic theoretical framework, Edward Muller
(1997) provides a more in depth assessment of the role economics plays in
democratization. In modernization theory, as a nation’s economy moves into an
intermediate zone of development it passes a threshold in which democratic trends are
more likely to be sustained. However, this was not the case in some parts the world, most
commonly Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The main reason he found was the fact
that increasing economic development was also positively associated with an increasing
income inequality. His study found that the lowest level of income inequality, which had
a positive effect on the development of democracy, was at the intermediate level of
economic development. Thus, income inequality as a result of economic progress hinders
democracy at a certain point (Muller, 1997).
In an examination of 140 countries, over a forty year period, focusing on when
economical and political liberalization occurred, it was found that it is difficult to
establish the direction of the causal relationship between political liberalization and
economic liberalization. However, it was also found that in countries where economic
liberalization had preceded political liberalization, the resulting democracies faired better
5

in the long run than those that democratized before implementing economic liberalization
(Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2004). It is possible then that nations that had experienced
economic liberalization first, consequently experienced economic growth providing the
subsequent democratization movement a more favorable environment in which to take
root. This more favorable environment could be the result of post-materialistic values that
have developed as a result of economic success.
Michael Coppedge (1997) is quick to point out however that modernization
theory is lacking in that it is hard to determine what factors of modernization have caused
democratization and which ones have caused by-products that are present but not
significant for democratization. Vanhanen (2003) concluded that it is not singularly
economic or political development that causes democracy, yet it is a singular path, one
that combines that the vast majority of countries follow to achieve a stable democracy
(Vanhanen, 2003).
Political culture, a society’s attitude and feelings towards the country’s political
system and its leaders and how they view their role in that system, has presented itself as
one of the more important areas in the study of democratization (Diamond, 1997). In the
study of political culture, three levels of orientations exist. Cognitive orientation entails
possessing knowledge of the political system; affective orientation denotes possession of
feelings towards said political system, while evaluational orientation indicates
commitment to a specific set of political principles. However, these varying attitudes and
variances of a political culture are subject to change in response to political and cultural
stimuli. The successful democratization in once authoritarian countries such as Germany,
Japan, Italy, and some of the former Soviet Republic attest to this fact (Diamond, 1999).
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Cultural factors such as religion, amount of political trust in a society, citizens’
beliefs in the rule of law, teaching of civic ideas, and overall satisfaction with life often
influence democratization as well. Furthermore, Protestant nations are more likely to
adopt democracy while Confucian and Islamic nations are not (Huntington, 1984).
Traditional Confucian societies like China did not believe in civil liberties as such that
the Western democratized world regards as normal. Furthermore, the maintenance of the
status quo social order and hierarchy was respected over ideological clashes. In addition,
Confucianism did not advocate the separation of powers in government as it believed that
its rulers were divine and incapable of corruption. Traditional Islam also lacks this idea of
the separation of powers, an idea which many Western democracies hold in high regards.
This argument within cultural theory is however spoiled by the relative success of
democracy in Japan, South Korea, and Turkey (Huntington, 1991).
However, more attention needs to be given specifically to the relationship
between political culture and democratization. Inglehart (1988) concluded that economic
development fosters democracy only because it first changes political culture and the
structure of society. While economic development helps foster democratic reform; its
influence is closely associated with the presence of cultural development. Cultural
development subsumes the rise of a middle class, development of social institutions, and
an increasingly more educated society (Inglehart, 1998).
Economic development without cultural development is dangerous and can
produce authoritarian substitutes for liberal democracy (Inglehart, 1988). This assertion
has important implications for Hong Kong as well as China and other authoritarian
governments with successful economies, such as the Middle Eastern oil producing
7

economies. These regimes continue to operate in an authoritarian manner but have been
able to keep domestic opposition at bay because of their stable economy, which gives
them de facto legitimacy.
Economic legitimacy in China began with the creation of a special economic
zone (SEZ) directly across the border from Hong Kong in the early 1980s. This SEZ, the
city of Shenzhen, created a free market economy and capitalism was thus allowed to
strengthen. From a small fishing village when it was created, to today, a bustling center
of economic power which is inhabited by over 12 million people, Shenzhen has
experienced massive economic development. In 2004, it posted a record GDP of nearly
US$4.9 billion and a per capita GDP of over US$7,000. Additionally, its exports
accounted for 1/7 of China’s total exports. These figures rank among the highest or at the
top of China’s mainland economic figures (Shenzhen Government Online, 2008).
Shenzhen then served as a model for the rest of China for the incorporation of economic
growth and capitalism. Even though China has experienced high rates of economic
development, its people have not experienced development in political culture, and the
authoritarian government’s rule remains unchallenged.
As part of this change in political culture, as interpersonal trust rises, so does
personal happiness and life satisfaction. Consequently, a civic culture that promotes
democracy is negatively associated with desire for revolutionary change (Inglehart,
1988). Another positive consequence of the development of political culture is the
increased participation in civic organizations. Greater involvement in civil society is
associated with greater democratic legitimacy and voting participation (Booth and
Richard, 1998).
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One component of political culture is political efficacy, the value that citizens
place on participating in politics and their capacity to influence that process (Lee, 2005).
Measuring political efficacy in a society can often give a good representation of how
democratic ideals are faring. However, as was the case in the Soviet Union, those with a
high degree of political efficacy derived from high educational attainment and interest in
politics, are not likely to participate in undemocratic elections (Lee, 2005). This
occurrence of poll absentee protest has also been seen in Mainland China during local
elections in which only one party’s candidates are allowed to run (Lee, 2005).
An important measure of political efficacy is the way in which a society
participates in the political process. There are two types of political efficacy. First,
individual efficacy is an individual’s belief in their own ability to fully participate in
political affairs and achieve desired outcomes. Second, collective efficacy is an
individual’s belief in their community or society to act together as a single unit to
successfully participate in the government. Collective efficacy and its support for
democracy are derived from the individuals’ belief in the group rather than in their own
abilities (Lee, 2005). In this study, both individual and collective efficacies are observed,
however collective efficacy was found to be more influential in Hong Kong.
For a society that cannot depend upon the ballot box for participation, protest
participation is an important avenue for demonstrating political efficacy. Mancur Olson
(1965) argued that a dilemma exists in protest participation because, while there are fixed
non-negligible costs to participating in a protest, the outcome of the protest is hardly
affected by an individual’s participation. However, if an individual personally believes in
their ability to influence the outcome, they will participate. In short, the fix to the
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dilemma of participation is not to look at it from a cost- benefit standpoint, but from that
of an individual and their perceived attitude towards participation. What drives
individuals to participate generally includes displeasure with the current economic or
political environment, feelings of injustice, societal disposition towards political
participation, and sense of communal belonging. If individuals that participate in protests
or other political activities are able to link their political activities with the reality of their
personal lives, they will be more likely to find their political experience meaningful and
participate further (Lee and Chan, 2008).
Another factor that influences democratization is the presence and intervention of
a foreign hegemon, or neighboring nation. Hegemonic powers may either promote or
stifle democracy through international institutions, economic means, or use of military
force. In fact, hegemons have intervened and overridden internal democratization factors
in a nation ready for democracy in favor of its own foreign policy, as was the case of
American intervention in Guatemala during the late 1950s (Zarate, 1994). This active
denial of democracy can be termed hegemonic deterrence. It has been most present in
Cold War Eastern Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.
The most recent example of hegemonic deterrence is the backlash against
democracy and the re-entrenchment of authoritarianism in Russia and Central Asia. After
the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and West European states seized the
opportunity to spread their influence over formerly authoritarian nations and take
advantage of the hegemonic void created by the Soviet Union’s economical and political
implosion. Within the last several years Russia has recovered economically and
politically and now possesses a successful authoritarian capitalist economy, similarly to
10

China. Further evidence of this resurgence has been the recent invasion of neighboring
Georgia.
By regaining the position of a regional hegemon, Russia under Vladimir Putin
began to roll back some of the democratic success witnessed in the 1990s. The election of
anti-Russian leaders to the executive offices in Ukraine and Georgia caused Putin to take
measures to ensure that Russia and its former satellites did not meet the same fate
(Basora, 2007). This fear of a domino effect is in part what pushed NATO and the Soviet
Union into partitioning Europe during the Cold War. It is possible that Beijing fears the
democratic success in Hong Kong as a trigger for Taiwan to declare formal
independence, or Tibet to break away from the Peoples Republic, if given broad
autonomy. While hegemonic states may move to block democratization, international
organizations (IOs) also have an effect on a country’s democratization.
Democratizing states that have the support of regional international organizations
(RIOs) are more likely to have a successful democratization process. Arceneaux and
Pion-Berlin (2007) contend that hegemons do not promote democracy as a random act of
kindness but as a projection of their influence and desire to achieve policy goals. The
Organization of American States (OAS) has supported democratic transitions in Latin
America when democratic transition in one nation will benefit the vital interests of the
member states. However, when the OAS does not give that support, the resulting
democratic regimes are democratically deficient, resulting in inefficient governing, civil
unrest, and a preference for autocratic methods of solving problems of which democracy
was supposed to alleviate (Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin, 2007). In an era of increasing
globalization it is difficult and foolish for nations to remain outside of RIOs and IOs.
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China and Hong Kong have both joined such organizations and to a certain degree their
domestic policies are a result of those organizations.
Political repression, more specifically voter intimidation in this case, is meant to
silence or limit government opposition. It has also been used to maintain the status quo of
demands on the government. Above all, it insulates the government from the wishes of
the masses (Booth and Bayer, 1996). While political repression can take many forms and
arise in many different situations, it is in elections that it is most apparent. Elections, the
cornerstone of democracy, have to be free and fair in theory and in practice in order for
democracy to function correctly. Dahl categorizes free and fair elections among other
things as exhibiting little or no intimidation (Dahl, 1998). Not only does Election Day
need to be free and fair but the time leading up to and after the election needs to be void
of coercion as well. Possible criteria for judging an election as free and fair is whether or
not it instills confidence in the democratic system and makes people want to continue
participating in it (Elklit and Svensson, 1997).
Furthermore, fairness or equality among the electorate is one of the cornerstones
of democracy according to Dahl. Democracy only works to its full potential when there is
a degree of fairness and everyone is given an equal voice (Dahl, 1998). Voter
intimidation is a direct threat to democratic freedom and fairness. By being unfairly
pressured to vote a certain way, a voter’s voice is silenced, thus voiding their opinion and
their chance at equal representation in government. If a significant number of voters are
victims of voter intimidation, the entire election and resulting government’s legitimacy is
called into question.

12

Regimes in which an election’s freedom and fairness are called into question can
often be described as semi-authoritarian (Carothers, 2000). These regimes are somewhere
in the democratic transition zone in between a consolidated democracy and an absolute
dictatorship. Semi-authoritarian governments employ means of democracy to legitimize
their rule, yet do not fully implement democracy for the fear that they will lose control of
the government. The problems posed by semi-authoritarian regimes towards
democratization movements include but are not limited to the stifling of efforts by prodemocratization groups, impeding efficient formulation and implementation of public
policy, and most importantly for this study, the rise of the question of whether or not
consolidated democracy will ever exist (Carothers, 2000).
There seems to be a difference however between perceived repression and actual
state sponsored repression and its effect on political participation. Booth and Richard
(1996) found that while open and state sponsored political repression negatively effects
support of and participation in democracy, perceived repression has little negative effect.
Furthermore, they found that in regions where political unrest exists, citizens tended to
curtail their participation in elections and political parties in favor of interest group
participation and talking to elected officials directly (Booth and Richard, 1996).
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CHAPTER III
CASE STUDY

Hong Kong’s system of government has not been altered significantly since the
handover in 1997. In accordance with the tenets agreed upon at the handover, Hong Kong
is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. As a SAR, Hong Kong has a high
degree of autonomy over everything except international relations and defense matters.
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Government (HKSAR) retained much of the
civil servant infrastructure as well as the make up of their governing bodies. More
importantly Hong Kong held onto many of its guaranteed freedoms such as freedom of
the press, speech, and assembly, rights that are not recognized on the mainland. The
Chief Executive is selected by an 800 member committee appointed by the Central
People’s Government and is elected to a maximum of two five year terms. The
Legislative Council (LegCo) is comprised of 60 members, of which half are directly
elected by the people from geographical constituencies and half are elected by
representatives from various economic sectors known, as functional constituencies. The
LegCo does not have the power to make and pass legislation. However the Chief
Executive’s bills must gain majority support in the LegCo in order to be made into law
(Wai-man et al, 2007).
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Table 1: Comparison of 2007 Asian Economic and Education Figures by GDP/ capita
Country
Singapore
Hong Kong
Japan
Taiwan
S. Korea

GDP/
capita
$49,700
$42,000
$33,600
$30,100
$24,800

GDP -purchasing
power parity
$228,100, 000
$292,800,000
$ 4,290,000,000,000
$695,400,000
$1,201,000,000

Population
4,608,167
7,018,636
127,288,419
22,920,946
49,232,844

GDP/ GDP/ capita ratio
2.17x10^-3
1.43x10^-4
7.83x10^-9
4.33x10^-5
2.06x10^-5

Literacy
92.5%
93.5%
99.0%
96.1%
97.9%

Source: CIA World Factbook

Table 1, illustrates that Hong Kong has one of the region’s most successful
economies for size. As of 2007, the SAR had a GDP of nearly $300 billion and a GDP
per capita of $42,000. This per capita GDP, as compared to democratized nations in the
region is considerably higher ($24,800 in South Korea, $33,600 in Japan, and $30,100 in
Taiwan.) The only country in the region with a higher per capita GDP is Singapore, a
parliamentary republic, at $49,700 (CIA World Factbook). The GDP to GDP per capita
ratio is a measure of a country’s individual contributions to the GDP. The smaller the
resulting number, the greater the individual contribution is. Singapore has the lowest ratio
closely followed by Hong Kong. Ironically, the largest economy, Japan, has the highest
ratio. It is reasonable to infer that a greater individual contribution signifies a higher
average level of educational obtainment and economic productivity. When looking at
more established indicators such as GDP per hour worked as a percent of the United
States, Hong Kong’s per person output (66%) greater than its regional counterparts (54%
for Singapore, 47% for Taiwan, and 37% for South Korea) except for Japan (72%) (Ark
and McGuckin, 1999). While these figures slightly contradict those in Table 1, Hong
Kong’s labor output ranks at the top of the list in both instances. Furthermore, the Ark
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and McGuckin figures are eight years old while the figures in Table 1 are much more
recent.
With respect to educational attainment and literacy rates, all of the countries listed
have a high degree of literacy and educational attainment. Hong Kong is like many of its
Asian neighbors in that it has a high degree of literacy, a highly productive population,
and strong economic output, yet it does not have the political development that is present
in its counterparts as can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Map of Asian Freedom
Source: Freedom House, 2008
16

Every year, Freedom House publishes a report on freedom around the world. The
report looks at a country’s political rights and respect for civil liberties and assigns a
numerical value for the degree of freedom found in that country. It is not a measure of
democracy but a measure of the freedoms on which democracy depends (Freedom
House, 2008). Therefore, the existence of political freedom and respect for civil liberties
is a good indicator of political development.
Three of the five countries represented in Table 1 have a higher degree of political
development than Hong Kong. Only one other, Singapore, has the same degree of
development. It is interesting to note that the countries with the higher GDP per capita are
only partly free. This gives credit to Muller’s theory that high levels of economic
development start to hinder political development at a certain point.
Since 1997, Hong Kong has witnessed several pro-democracy protests, the
biggest being in 2003 at the height of the discontent towards the SAR government and its
first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. The 2003 protest, which by some estimates was
attended by 500,000 people, was precipitated by a national security bill that was
perceived by many in Hong Kong as Beijing’s attempt to take away some of their
political freedoms. Since then, every year on July 1, the anniversary of the handover, pro
democracy advocates have staged large protests urging the SAR and central governments
to fully democratize the territory. The annual protest and other pro-democracy protests
while attended by large numbers have not again reached the levels of 2003.
The Green Paper on Constitutional Development, a type of report that states the
government’s position on a matter but does not legally bind it to any action, was
published in July 2007 and is the HKSAR’s official stance on the democratization of the
17

SAR. It supports the maintenance of the status quo and does not signify any change in the
government’s position since 2004. Although the HKSAR and the Central Authority claim
to support universal suffrage in Hong Kong, they do not provide a functioning time line
nor do they lay out any new measures that would introduce it into the voting system. The
document gives 2012 as the year for possibly instituting universal suffrage, but does not
provide a time table for enacting it. Although the Green Paper does not provide
information about voter intimidation and specifics of popular support for
democratization, it does give the HKSAR’s official stance on suffrage.
Presently, the National People’s Congress (NPC) stated in late 2007 that universal
suffrage will be delayed until 2017 for the chief executive and 2020 for the LegCo. This
is the same governing body that has interpreted the Basic Law and this is their first
legally binding commitment to democratic consolidation in Hong Kong. The NPC
defends its position by acknowledging that democracy is necessary for Hong Kong to
sustain development and that it is further in line with the vision of the Chinese reform
leader Deng XiaoPing. However, universal suffrage must be delayed in order for political
and social institutions to catch up and prepare for the coming shift in power. Chinese law
professor and member of NPC governing body for Hong Kong, Wang Zhemin, contends
that, as the new political system transfers power from societal and financial elites to the
mass public, the current system must be reformed (Zhemin, 2008). Beijing’s reluctance to
allow universal suffrage is a reflection of their wish to slowly implement democracy and
to ensure that Hong Kong is socially and politically ready.
Shortly before the protests in the summer of 2003, a survey conducted by Ming
Sing of the City University of Hong Kong found that 74 percent of respondents were
18

dissatisfied with the government to some degree (Sing, 2005). During that same time
period 70 percent to 80 percent of respondents wanted universal suffrage by 2008. Data
from the same survey has also shown that the support for democracy has been driven by
political matters more so than economic matters. This survey also examines Hong Kong’s
support for democracy by age group. The findings show that there is no relationship
between support for democracy and age, which contradicts the long held belief among
Hong Kong scholars that the elderly are more supportive of democracy (Sing, 2005).
However, this support for democracy and demonstration of political efficacy has
not always been the case in Hong Kong. The territory’s population has traditionally been
influenced by Chinese history, a British colonial legacy, and flight immigration (Lee and
Chan, 2008). The latter influence was the result of a large influx of mainland Chinese
during Mao’ revolution. This essentially refuge population, marred by the political,
social, and economical upheaval that the revolution brought, sought to maintain political
stability before anything else. This political conservatism also led Hong Kongers to
distrust government officials and created a sense of political hopelessness. Political
hopelessness led to a lack of public interest in territorial politics, along with a lack of
desire for political reform (Lee and Chan, 2008). Hong Kongers have also developed a
view of skepticism towards politicians, the political process and a general disposition that
views politics as dirty (Lee, 2005).
Hong Kong’s fear of disrupting the status quo and its lack of political efficacy led
to several consequences that have not necessarily been anti-democratic; rather, nonsupportive of democratic growth. In 1985, 62 percent of those surveyed felt that they had
no control over the direction of Hong Kong’s political future (Fok, 1997). This
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perception and desire to avoid conflict was a reflection of the sentiment that made it
unlikely that political parties would ever form. It was not until the late 1980s and the
early 1990s, when it was apparent that Hong Kong would revert to Chinese rule and
political reforms were necessary, that the political parties began to emerge. This political
powerlessness runs contrary to the standard experience of other societies who, like Hong
Kong, are wealthy, educated, and globalized, that involve themselves with politics and
push for political reform (Fok, 1997).
When examining Hong Kong’s middle class, this deficient political culture is
even more apparent and has even deeper contributing factors. In fact, the current political
behavior demonstrated by the middle class can be traced to events before Mao’s
revolution. The development of a middle class is contingent upon being able to develop
and consolidate political and societal forces within the class. Yet, the perpetual
introduction of immigrants into Hong Kong disrupted this consolidation and the middle
class had to start over in its development each time a new wave of immigrants was
introduced. This first wave occurred during WWII and then was closely followed by
Mao’s revolution in 1949. Immigrant influxes created downward social mobility for those
in the middle class as the economy responded to an increase in the labor force by
downgrading occupations and thereby the social standing of the middle class (Lui, 2003).
This gloomy outlook towards social mobility manifested itself in the Mitchell
Hong Kong Families Survey in 1967 in which a disproportionate number of Hong Kong
citizens, as compared to other societies in the region, believed they did not have the
chance for career advancement (Lui, 2003). The perception of hopelessness not only
affected the middle class’ social standing but its political standing as well. It was not until
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the 1970s and later, when Hong Kong moved from a light industry oriented economy into
a service oriented economy that the status of the middle class stabilized and became more
noticeable. With this newfound advancement, those in the middle class were more
concerned about economic stability and growth rather, than political development that
might return the middle class to the instability that it experienced during the mid
twentieth century. (Lui, 2003).
Due to the mindset of maintaining political and social stability above all else,
civic education in schools was never a priority in Hong Kong. Up until the 1980s,
teachers were prohibited from discussing, let alone teaching, domestic politics and
students were banned from starting political organizations (Fok, 1997).
It was only after 1984 and the signing of the Joint Declaration that Hong Kong
began to emphasize civic education in its schools. Even then the scope and nature of civic
education was poorly defined. This vagueness can be attributed to the overriding
sensitivity to political matters, and as a result implementation of civic education in the
late 1980s and early 1990s was less than effective as hoped. Political education is
important in that it can give citizens the tools and understanding needed to participate
fully in a liberal democracy (Fok, 1997).
Before the handover in 1997 civic education to the Chinese meant Hong Kong’s
students identifying themselves as Chinese first and Hong Kongers second (Fok, 1997).
The exact direction that Hong Kong civil education textbooks take in teaching civic
matters today is not quite known due to the unavailability of material. However it is
easily acceptable to predict China’s disposition to fostering nationalism in Hong Kong.
Chinese nationalism is aimed at uniting children with the motherland and the practices of
21

the PRC government, a goal that runs counter to that of advocates of civic education in
Hong Kong. While this assertion is disturbing for democracy, according to the previously
mentioned survey by Sing (2005), the younger segments of population, who have been
reared under both British and Chinese rule have developed an affinity for democracy and
show support for democracy in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong’s citizens exhibit a strong amount of collective efficacy for both
democratization and political participation, but a low amount of individual efficacy in
support of democracy. This runs counter to the argument that collective efficacy is rooted
in individual efficacy. In established democracies, political efficacy is instilled early on
during childhood. However, as Hong Kong is a transitional society, it has come from
somewhere else. In a transitional society, political efficacy is more likely to come from
the events that an individual witnesses during said transition process (Lee, 2005). This is
a great example of political socialization, the adoption of political ideas and participation
in the political process. It is likely that the development of Hong Kong’s political efficacy
has been due to the combination of their attempt at civic education and the transitional
events that have occurred since the mid 1980s.
Beijing has used an array of tactics to stifle the independence and democratization
movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively. First is the use of identity politics to
discredit individuals and ideas which run counter to Beijing’s. Such measures have the
purpose to discredit traditional Chinese history, publicly remind those in Hong Kong and
Taiwan that they are ethnically Han Chinese, and label those who do not support the
Beijing school of thought as traitors and unpatriotic. Secondly, the P.R.C. has used the
politics of sovereignty to de-legitimize the Taiwanese government and the
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democratization movement in Hong Kong (Guoguang, 2007). By domestically and
internationally asserting that Taiwan and Hong Kong belong to China, it causes these off
shore democracies to lose support at home and legitimacy abroad.
Most importantly for this study is the third method Beijing has employed and it is
that of economic penetration (Guoguang, 2007). Taiwan and Hong Kong have both
become increasingly dependent on the Chinese economy and this has allowed Beijing to
increasingly use economic means to influence the offshore governments, although this
has not been extensively studied, according to Guoguang. This represents the greatest
challenge to the two offshore democracy grassroots movements and exhibits Beijing’s
greatest degree of interference in its autonomous regions. Reports from voters themselves
have surfaced of voter intimidation in Hong Kong and Taiwan on the grounds of
economic intimidation (Guoguang, 2007). Pro-Beijing elements have targeted
businessmen who are dependent on their cross-border economic ties. This intervention
has had negative effects on the pro-democracy camps in both Taiwan and Hong Kong
(Guoguang, 2007). While Guoguang’s findings and postulates provided the impetus for
my study, he was not able to provide empirical evidence of voter intimidation, most
likely because it has not yet been documented on an academic and comprehensive level
and has remained largely anecdotal evidence.
Another economic stumbling block to democracy in Hong Kong has been the
relationship between Beijing and the business elite in Hong Kong; otherwise known as
the unholy alliance (So, 2000). Prior to the handover, big business and the colonial
government had a close relationship. That began to change however after the Joint
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Declaration was signed and the business elites realized the coming change in power (So,
2000).
In describing external factors of democratization, Pevehouse (2002) references
Leigh Payne’s (1994) assertion that business elites do not necessarily favor
authoritarianism over democracy, but favor what is in their company’s best interest. For
many presidents, owners, and CEOs, democracy represents a breakdown in order,
increased competition from open markets, and radically liberal changes. Success in
confronting these fears of the business elites have been met in Europe by assuring rights
and protection to the interests of the upper business class (Pevehouse, 2002).
The relationship between economic performance and the quality of government in
Hong Kong has followed a deteriorating path since 1997 (Groenewold and Tang, 2007).
The HKSAR’s approval rating began to decline significantly in the early 2000s, as the
Chief Executive and his administration fumbled several policy issues. The study found a
positive relation between democratic accountability and constraint of executive power as
it relates to economic performance. As democratic accountability and government
openness rose, so did economic performance. It also contends that there has been a
decrease in democratic accountability since 1997. Furthermore the robust economy of the
last few years has not caused a change in accountability. Simply put, the relationship
between accountability and the economy is only one way (Groenewold and Tang, 2007).
More evidence and accounts of voter intimidation are presented in Lam’s (2004)
article concerning the role of the central government in the SAR. Beijing’s intervention
has not been limited to private citizens as it also targeted Hong Kong elites, such as Allen
Lee who hosted a pro-democracy radio talk show “Storm in a Teacup” but left the show
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after being intimidated, much like his predecessors on the show (Lam, 2004). Lee’s
testimony is presented in a report by Human Rights Watch. Lee testifies that even his
daughters were threatened if he did not behave politically (Human Rights Watch, 2004).
Anecdotal accounts of voters having to use their cell phone cameras to record their
ballots are also presented. The level of interest that Beijing is taking in Hong Kong
politics is not surprising as Beijing had never been this nervous over political
developments in Hong Kong (Lam, 2004).
The report compiled by Human Rights Watch just days after the 2004 LegCo
elections provides the most complete and reliable account of voter intimidation thus far.
Data comes from interviews of over twenty journalists, political figures, and HKSAR
officials as well as reports from media outlets. The main tactic Beijing used in
influencing the 2004 LegCo election was labeling those who supported pro-democracy
parties or candidates as unpatriotic and supporting only those who were “patriotic” or
supportive of the motherland in their political careers. Beijing officials even threatened
increased intervention if the pro-democracy candidates won a majority of seats. Although
this tactic was used frequently and publicly, it did not produce the desired effect and was
abandoned (Human Rights Watch, 2004).
Voter intimidation was experienced as far out from the election as six months.
The report also includes detailed threats to a voter in which a senior staff member of the
voter’s employer pressured the voter to vote pro-Beijing. This report provides the most
up to date assessment of voter intimidation (Human Rights Watch, 2004). However, it
fails to move beyond the several accounts of voter intimidation to look at a broader scope
of intimidation, such as its effect on the middle class or business class as a whole.
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CHAPTER IV
THEORY

For this study, four separate hypotheses were developed from the democratization
and political repression literature. To test the validity of these hypotheses they will be
applied to the case study, Hong Kong. While the definitions for democracy have already
been addressed in this study, the qualifications used in analyzing the hypotheses will be
simplified to make the process easier. In this study, democratization is operationalized as
the practice or introduction of the one person one vote practice for electing both the
legislative and executive branches of government. With respect to political culture, a
weak political culture is defined as one that lacks the necessary norms and institutions to
promote a successful democracy. Figure 1 depicts the model that illustrates the causal
relationships developed in this section.
Hypothesis 1 The greater the presence of unchecked hegemonic deterrence, the
less likely democratization is to occur.
Hypothesis 2 The stronger the influence of anti-democratic elites is, the less
likely democratization is to occur.
Hypothesis 3 The weaker a society’s political culture, the less likely
democratization is to occur.
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Hypothesis 4 The greater the influence of political repression, the less likely
democratization is to occur

Unchecked
Hegemonic
Deterrence

H1

Democratization

Political
Repression

Anti-democratic
Elites

H4

H2

H3

Weak Political
Culture

Figure 2: Theoretical Model
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

The democratization literature suggests that Hong Kong should have already
transitioned into a democracy. However, the literature on Hong Kong offers a different
view. The explanation of why Hong Kong has not yet democratized includes several
factors that are unique to the former British colony. First, Hong Kong is not an
independent nation but a highly autonomous territory of a communist nation. Second, it is
a complex and fast paced society with many social and economic facets where many of
the factors needed for democratization have developed on their own. Finally, Hong Kong
straddles the fault line of the Eastern and Western world, therefore it has more competing
influences than a nation or region would normally have. An additional component of this
international fault line is Hong Kong’s experience as a Western colony and the influence
that its history continues to play.
The theoretical model shown in Figure 1 portrays the following hypotheses and
the relationships that they have to democratization. The three independent variables,
unchecked hegemonic deterrence, anti-democratic business elites, and weak political
culture all contribute directly to a lack of democratization in the case of Hong Kong.
Additionally, they help create the intervening variable that is political repression.
Political repression then in turn adversely affects democratization.
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Hypothesis 1
It is Beijing’s hegemonic deterrence that can best be attributed to Hong Kong’s
lack of meaningful democratic progress. While all of the conditions for a successful
democratization are in place, because the NPC disagrees with this assertion, full
democracy has been withheld. Evidence of this is demonstrated in Beijing’s decision to
delay popular LegCo elections until 2017 (Zhemin, 2008). As with many other nations in
the region that have successfully democratized and consolidated in the last forty years,
Hong Kong has a large middle class that is characterized by stable economic success, a
high degree of educational attainment, and an established well functioning civil society
that respects the rule of law. However, just as important as China’s deterrence is the lack
of positive encouragement from both regional neighbors and multinational regional
organizations.
Support for democracy from abroad is nearly as important as it is at home.
Foreign support can legitimize a democratic regime as well as lend advice and support in
the transition. Hegemonic influence was vital in the democratization efforts of South
America and especially in Eastern Europe. While the United States sometimes hindered
democracy in South America, as seen in Chile in the 1980s, it has a track record of aiding
democratic transitions. In Eastern Europe, after the fall of the Iron Curtain and
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the European Union’s democratic requirements for
admission into the trade union can be credited for democratic success in the region.
In the case of Hong Kong, neither a single state hegemon nor a multinational
organizational hegemon that strongly advocates universal suffrage in Hong Kong exists.
Hong Kong is surrounded by less or only partially politically free nations like China,
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Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines. These neighbors would not support democratic
reform in Hong Kong, as they do not in their own countries. While the United States
might pass Congressional resolutions that support Hong Kong’s democratization and
bring it up in diplomatic meetings, the U.S. will not sacrifice trade relations over Hong
Kong’s political matters. With respect to a regional multinational hegemon, ASEAN does
not share its European counterpart’s high affinity for democracy (ASEAN Principles,
2008).
While the European Union was initially a trade organization, it has taken an
increasingly more political role as it has evolved into the economic and political entity
that it is today. The EU did not actively promote democratic forms of government in the
beginning because before the 1990s all of the members followed liberal democratic
principles to some degree. However, with the inclusion of the formerly communist
nations of Central and Eastern Europe it became necessary to safeguard the political
integrity of the union. This was accomplished by requiring potential members to
demonstrate their ability to function as a democracy, protect personal freedoms, operate
under the rule of law, and defend human rights and minority groups (Michalski, 2006).
This regard for democracy has caused many of the EU’s members and potential
members to strive for more open government and democratic consolidation. A prime
example is how Slovakia and Turkey have transitioned their governments towards a more
consolidated democracy in hope of gaining EU membership. Both governments have
worked to resolve border issues and improve the openness of their democratic process in
addition to improving respect for civil liberties. These actions not only increase their
chances for EU membership but also increase the quality of democracy. This is important
30

because healthy and consolidated democracies will not produce the semi-authoritarianism
seen in low-quality democracies.
In contrast, ASEAN lacks the democratic condition both for membership and for
continued membership in the trade union. As stated by the ASEAN Declaration, the goal
of the trade organization is to foster economic, social, and cultural growth while
promoting stability, without the mention of democratic governance. In fact, ASEAN’s
stance on a member country’s domestic affairs runs directly perpendicular to the EU’s.
Under the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), ASEAN will not
interfere in domestic issues and neither will its member nations interfere with each others
(ASEAN Overview, 2008). While China is only a peripheral member, ASEAN’s lack of
democratic affinity demonstrates the dearth of democratic support from regional
hegemons. In line with Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin’s (2007) theoretical contention, it is
not in ASEAN’s member nations’ best interest to actively push for democracy in Hong
Kong.
With respect to IOs as a whole, perhaps it is the strength of the organization’s
economic influence and its ability to enforce regulations that determines whether or not it
will be able to promote democracy. The European Union, despite its failed attempts to
pass a constitution (as of summer 2008), has engineered itself as an international
economic powerhouse, and its international economic power holds its members, and
those that wish to adhere, to the policies that its elites set forth. It is also with this power
that the EU has been able to protect the capital’s interests. ASEAN evidently lacks this
power, much in part because the economic powers of the region, Japan and China, are
only associate members. The other IOs that China belongs to, the WTO and the UN to
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name a few, lack the economic power to promote policy goals and ensure capital’s
protection in China and subsequently Hong Kong when it comes to political
liberalization.
However, ASEAN has the possibility of growing into a more coordinated and
integrated union such as the EU. Through ASEAN and the East Asian Summit, greater
integration and movement towards the creation of the Asian Economic Community is
possible. Although, whether an integrated Asia will promote democracy like the EU is
yet to be seen, however given ASEAN’s record, it is not likely.
Political repression has benefited from unchecked hegemonic deterrence in that it
has pushed government officials in the mainland to pressure Hong Kong citizens to vote
against pro-democracy parties, and discouraged pro-democracy supporters from
participation by labeling them as unpatriotic. Furthermore, since Beijing’s hegemonic
deterrence is unchecked in the region, there are not any external actors that will condemn
any repression that takes place.
The 2004 LegCo election witnessed for the first time widespread accounts of
voter intimidation at the polls. This upswing in political repression is most likely a result
of the increased demands for democracy as seen in the summer 2003 protests. Voter
intimidation in this case came from mainland officials and was directed at not just those
in the middle class but at societal elites as well. The tactics ranged from threats directed
at family, as was the case with Allen Lee, to photographing ballots in order to prove
support for pro-Beijing parties and candidates. Mainland officials would not have
engaged in this behavior had the suppression of democratic ideas not been a part of
Beijing’s HKSAR policy.
32

The identification of democracy supporters as unpatriotic has allowed Beijing to
tap into the nationalistic fervor that permeates Chinese society. This domestic projection
of hegemonic deterrence, although not as successful as Beijing had hoped, still placed an
unfair burden on those wishing to support and vote for pro-democracy interests. While
this is a much milder form of political repression than threatening life and property, it is
nonetheless an attempt by Beijing to sway domestic politics in their favor. Hegemonic
deterrence has created an atmosphere where it is acceptable to apply the label of
unpatriotic to those who, regardless of their social standing, support and vote for prodemocracy interests.
Finally, when hegemonic deterrence is unchecked it allows political repression to
continue without condemnation and action from those in the region. This characteristic of
hegemonic deterrence has two features: Hong Kong’s lack of political aid from regional
international organizations and the dearth of politically free nations/ societies in the Asian
region. Hong Kong, China, and their neighbors belong to several regional trade
organizations. However, unlike other trade organizations like the EU, Asian trade
organizations do not prioritize democratic reform and will not oppose any incidents of
political repression, thereby creating an environment in which it is in de facto acceptance.
Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 1, the map of Asian political freedom, in
many of Hong Kong’s neighboring countries political freedom is limited or non-existent,
thus they are highly unlikely to speak out against abuses of political rights. Neighbors
like Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and Cambodia will not speak out against voter
intimidation, as they practice these abuses themselves. Political repression would not be
tolerated within other RIOs like the European Union. This inability of Asian RIOs to
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stand up against Beijing’s disregard for fair democratic rules has allowed political
repression in Hong Kong to exist. The above discussion pertaining to the relationship
between unchecked hegemonic deterrence and political repression has been upheld by the
democratization and political repression literature in conjunction with the case study
literature.
Hypothesis 1 argues that unchecked hegemonic deterrence hinders the
democratization of a country or region, such as that of Hong Kong. Evidence of
hegemonic deterrence is evident in Beijing’s refusal to currently allow universal suffrage.
While Beijing has allowed some political reforms, such as geographical representation in
the LegCo, and has set a timetable for democratization, the degree to which the reforms
have been enacted has not been in the spirit or the scope of the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law agreed upon by London and Beijing. Increasing participation and interference
in Hong Kong’s domestic matters also denotes hegemonic deterrence. These actions have
plagued Hong Kong’s democratization and adversely affected it. Evidence from the case
of Hong Kong supports Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2
Although Hong Kong’s situation is unique, its political development should be
following the parallel development path. For example, while many factors were
associated with the successful democratization of Taiwan and South Korea, both nations
experienced steady economic growth and achieved comparable per capita GDP’s before
democratization. What is surprising and worth noting is that Hong Kong‘s per capita
GDP surpassed South Korea’s and Taiwan’s per capita GDP at their times of
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democratization. In South Korea, full direct elections were held in 1987. At that time,
South Korea’s GDP was $22.1 billion with a GDP per capita of $5,361. Hong Kong’s
GDP at that time was $101.3 billion and it had a GDP per capita of $16,797. At the time
of Taiwan’s full democratization in 1996, its GDP was $256.8 billion accompanied by a
GDP per capita of $12,018. In Hong Kong, in 1996 right before the handover, its GDP
was $145.3 billion and its per capita GDP of $22,740 (Shane, 2007).
Even though Hong Kong has many of the characteristics of a modernized
developed society such as a market economy, high levels of literacy and education, and
low levels of civic violence, universal suffrage and democratic consolidation is absent. It
is for this reason that the modernization theory does not apply to Hong Kong’s case
(Muller, 1997). In fact, this theory using inequality as a mechanism that explains a
convex shaped relationship between economic development and democratization fits
Hong Kong’s case and might explain part of its failure to democratize.
Muller (1997) argued that democratization is more likely to occur at a median point
of economic development. After this optimal point, economic development begins to
create a pronounced income gap that has been associated with authoritarian
entrenchment. This entrenchment is supported by the societal elites who benefit from not
having to contend with free market forces. Evidence of this is found in the previously
mentioned literature concerning the unholy alliance between Hong Kong business elites
and Beijing.
The split between business elites and democratization in Hong Kong stemmed
from events that occurred before the handover. As Britain was getting ready to hand the
colony over, the British colonial Governor Chris Patten’s last minute democratic welfare
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reforms pushed the business elites to favor the undemocratic Beijing government and its
policies. This fragmentation led to the formation of pro-Beijing political parties that have
made up the pro-Beijing united front that the democrats have found so hard to overcome.
Additionally, Patten’s reforms that did make it through the LegCo prompted Beijing to
dissolve the legislative body after the handover, as it clamed that the reforms violated the
Basic Law (So, 2000).
Additionally, the Chinese excuse of delaying democracy in order for Hong Kong
business elites to adjust to a more free market system is more evidence of the
undemocratic leaning of Hong Kong’s business elites. In reiterating Pevehouse’s (2002)
assertion that business elites are not necessarily anti-democratic but adhere to whatever
environment will be most advantageous to their profit margin, a parallel can be drawn to
Hong Kong. Under colonial rule Hong Kong business was closely allied with the British
colonial government and took steps to maintain that relationship. Once it was apparent
that China would take back Hong Kong, business elites switched their alliance to Beijing
and took steps to foster a healthy relationship with their new government. This new
relationship required tempering their support for democracy, thereby silencing any
support for democracy from the business and, to a large part, societal elites. While the
limited democratic success occurred partly because of the middle class, support from the
business and societal elites is necessary in order to fully democratize. It is this segment of
society that controls economic investment and can have greater success in petitioning the
government for reform. Thus Hong Kong’s democratization movement is handicapped by
the lack of support from elites.
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In the case of Hong Kong, with a few exceptions, the elites have not been
supportive of democracy. This lack of support has even manifested itself in incidents of
political repression directed at those in the middle class and contributed to an
environment inclined to political repression. The elite’s desire to stifle democracy
through political repression is rooted in Hong Kong’s experience with conflict refugee
immigration and the privileges that elites are currently afforded in a less than open
business/ government relationship.
Hong Kong has had a history of immigration due to political upheaval on the
mainland. Consequently, Hong Kongers have strayed away from political reform and
focused more on social and economic advancement. Existing research on this notion of
maintaining the political status quo hardly ever differentiates between the classes.
Furthermore, a great number of those who immigrated to Hong Kong in the 1950s and
1960s and contributed to today’s booming economy were wealthy business owners from
cities such as Shanghai that were fleeing political persecution under Mao. This might not
have made them anti-democratic, but it made those in the upper class weary of political
change.
What has turned Hong Kong’s business elites against democracy has been the
close relationship they enjoy with the PRC government and those in the HKSAR
government that are installed by Beijing. The previously mentioned unholy alliance has
allowed Hong Kong businesses to operate without facing real competition. Of course
Hong Kong was ranked as the freest economy in the world. However, those ranking are
from an economic standpoint and fail to look at the political/ economic relationship that
influences the direction of economic/ labour specific legislation and awarding of
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contracts. In a fully democratic Hong Kong, business leaders would have to compete for
the legislation and contracts they depend on.
Furthermore, it is feared that if universal suffrage is granted, pro-labor legislation
will be passed, thereby hurting the elite’s profit. More support for Hypothesis 2 comes
from evidence where The People’s Congress is withholding democracy for the next ten
years. Beijing cites the reluctance of societal and business elites to transfer power to the
mass public. This reluctance can only lead some in the upper class to attempt to limit the
expansion of democracy.
In the 2004 LegCo election, political repression of societal elites and middle class
citizens occurred at the hands of anti-democratic elites. Reports of employees
photographing their ballots and sending it to their supervisors are a manifestation of the
anti-democratic elites’ attempts to limit democracy. While more research into the extent
of employer/ business elite sponsored repression is necessary, what has been established
is that the feelings and actions of those in the upper class have led to political repression.
Hypothesis 2 asserts that the stronger the anti-democratic business elites, the
lesser the likelihood of democratization of Hong Kong. As Hong Kong has developed
economically, the inequality gap between the upper class and those under has rapidly
increased. Due to this inequality gap and the conservative nature of Hong Kong business
elites that promotes economic profit and stability over political reform, democratization
has been rebuked by those elites. Further evidence of this was demonstrated by Beijing’s
citation of Hong Kong business elites’ need for gradual change in delaying universal
suffrage until 2017. A democracy movement needs the support of societal and business
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elites, however Hong Kong has not had the support and as a consequence democratic
reform has been hindered. Thus, evidence from Hong Kong supports Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3
While hegemonic deterrence and the relationship between Hong Kong business
elites and Beijing can partly explain Hong Kong’s lack of democratic reform, they fail to
explain how support for democratization among the middle class is not strong despite the
multitude of existing factors that would signal the contrary. Hong Kong suffers from a
weak political culture that hinders its political development. This weak political culture is
characterized by limited political efficacy, political hopelessness, a lack of civic
education, and a politically weak middle class. Existing literature has documented the
importance of political culture and has detailed the causes and effects of Hong Kong’s
errant political culture.
With concern to political efficacy, Hong Kong’s political culture has shaped its
political efficacy in a way that discourages participation by placing lesser importance on
political participation when compared to social stability or economic development. This
degradation of political participation has manifested itself in the political hopelessness
that has been exhibited as recently as the 1990s. This aspect of Hong Kong’s political
culture is detrimental to the democratization process as it gives individuals little reason to
participate in the political process. The most visible act of participation since the
handover has been the pro-democracy protests starting in 2003. However the type of
efficacy demonstrated in those protests was collective. While this is a step in the right
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direction, collective efficacy does not provoke individual participation, the type of
participation needed at the ballot box.
As a dependent colony of Britain, political rights and institutions were withheld
from the native Chinese citizens who grew to make up the middle class. Without the
necessary political institutions like civic education in schools and electoral
representation, democratic ideas that were introduced in the late 1980’s had trouble
taking root and subsequently have had trouble energizing the population since China
regained control in 1997.
Further contributing to Hong Kong’s deficient political culture has been the
constant influx of immigrants from areas and periods of conflict. Constant immigration
during the 1940s through 1960s caused the middle class to redevelop itself continuously
and thus was not able to gain political and economical capital. As these factors influenced
Hong Kong’s political culture as a whole, its development and subsequent support for
democracy in today’s environment has been hindered. Additionally, since much of
today’s middle class citizens immigrated to Hong Kong under times of conflict and
political upheaval, as was the case during Mao’s revolution, they have placed more
importance on social and economic progress, essentially maintaining the political status
quo while developing their own economic position and advancing socially. Democratic
reform is the antithesis of maintaining the status quo and as a result has produced a
political culture which strays away from it.
Hong Kong’s weak political culture is rooted primarily in the SAR’s lack of civic
education that would enforce democratic norms and the desire to not upset the political
status quo. While the Hong Kong education system has worked to introduce civic
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education in the past two decades, it has had to contend with Beijing’s view of civic
education which promotes nationalism over the function of government, much less
democratic governance. With political education comes the ability to participate in the
democratic process, political empowerment, and what the norms of that process are.
Without that knowledge of what should constitute a normal election, Hong Kong citizens
could not know that political repression, in any form and to any degree, is not acceptable.
Furthermore, without civic education individuals would lack the political empowerment
that it provides. This empowerment would be necessary to stand up to political
repression. An inability to stand up to repression makes Hong Kong society more
vulnerable to such repression.
Secondly, Hong Kong’s desire to maintain the political status quo has acted as a
deterrent to voicing discontent about political repression experiences. Actively voicing
such experiences would lead individuals to ostracization for upsetting that status quo and
would lead to social or economic penalties from either mainland officials or the Beijing
aligned business elites. The only substantial evidence found of political repression against
ordinary citizens in the 2004 LegCo elections came from anonymous callers into radio
shows, even though some reports surfaced, they were not in a direct manner. This is
indicative of belief in collective political efficacy, the individual belief in the political
abilities of the group rather than their own, as the individual experiencing repression
expresses it in a public manner and not in a direct manner towards election officials. It is
possible that this behaviour is more a reflection of actual repression and not Hong Kong’s
political culture. Further research is necessary to determine the cause of this behaviour.
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Regardless, the failure of Hong Kong citizens to individually stand against political
repression has allowed political repression.
Even though civic education has worked to instill some democratic principles,
political culture in Hong Kong is not yet strong enough to stand against political
repression. Furthermore, in the striving to maintain the political status quo, political
culture in Hong Kong has been degraded to the point where actively opposing political
repression is not accepted. However, this intervening relationship has more forces at
work and further research on the link between weak political culture and the existence of
political repression in the case of Hong Kong is necessary.
Hypothesis 3 asserts that a weak political culture contributes to a lack of
democratization. The findings suggest that the individual factors that make up Hong
Kong’s political culture have had adverse effects that they have had on Hong Kong
citizens’ support for democracy. On the whole, the political culture of non-participation,
maintenance of the status quo, and lack of democratically focused civic education has
hindered the development of a fully elected democratic government. Thus, evidence
found during this study supports Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4
There is no doubt that voters in the 2004 LegCo election experienced political
repression and intimidation. What is more important, however, is the effect that political
repression has had on pro-democracy efforts to win seats in the LegCo and the
democratization process as a whole. Political repression activities witnessed in 2004 are
most likely a result of the massive pro-democracy protests in 2003. Had the Hong Kong
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public been able to vote for the Chief Executive in 2003, these activities would have
likely been present. Furthermore, the Chief Executive and his government at the time
were so unpopular that the pro-Beijing government would have lost. For the first time in
2004, Beijing was concerned about the domestic political fate of Hong Kong and acted to
shape it in the way that its leaders saw fit.
Through these actions public figures advocating democracy such as Allen Lee
were silenced and individual voters were forced to vote for pro-Beijing candidates.
However, the extent to which repression occurred and its overall effect on the
democratization process remains unclear despite the supporting evidence that this study
has found. Leaders in the PRC government along with Hong Kong business leaders have
the motive to influence the outcome of LegCo elections. Public displeasure with the
government at times does point to a crisis of legitimacy which can be caused by political
repression. With each public figure that is silenced and each voter that must change their
vote, the democratization process loses ground to the semi-authoritarian system in place.
However, without knowing the extent to which repression is occurring, the effect
on the process cannot be determined. While political repression has been shown through
the literature to contribute to the lack of democratization, sufficient evidence of it
contributing to Hong Kong’s lack of democratization was not found. To further test this
hypothesis primary data pertaining to Hong Kong voters’ experiences with voter
intimidation is necessary. The source of the repression, i.e. employers, mainland officials,
etc., would need to be identified and then the impact that the incidence of repression had
on their participation in the election would need to be studied. Unfortunately, the
disenfranchised and most often politically repressed are a victimized population and
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obtaining data from that population presents obstacles. These people fear identification
and will be reluctant to discuss the topic. In the end, this study did not have the resources
to fully test Hypothesis 4 and it remains unsupported.
As can be seen in Figure 3, the results show that unchecked hegemonic
deterrence, anti-democratic elites, and a weak political culture have contributed to Hong
Kong’s lack of democratization. Without sufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 4 in
the case of Hong Kong, this hypothesis could not be supported by this study.
Furthermore, unchecked hegemonic deterrence and anti-democratic elites have
contributed to an atmosphere which encourages political repression. However, there was
not enough evidence to support the relationship between weak political culture and
political repression.
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Figure 3: Revised Theoretical Model

Even if sufficient evidence had been found, there are probably more significant
factors contributing to Hong Kong’s lack of democratic progress. The likely factors,
identified during the course of this research, but not part of the theoretical model include
lack of organization of the pro-democracy party and the institutional arrangements that
the pro-Beijing parties exploit. Pro-democracy parties have generally had a tough time
working together and have not been able to stand against the much better organized proBeijing parties. Furthermore, since the representatives in geographical constituent
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elections are chosen by proportional representation, the pro-democratic parties put forth
only one candidate compared to the several candidates from the pro-democracy parties
(Cheng, 2005). In doing this, the pro-Beijing parties gain an edge as the pro-democracy
supporters split their vote.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

This study aimed to identify the factors that have contributed to Hong Kong’s
sluggish democratization. Using Hong Kong as a case study, it was hypothesized that
unchecked hegemonic deterrence, anti-democratic elites, and a weak political culture
contribute to a lack of democratization. It was further hypothesized that political
repression that was influenced by the independent variables contributed to the problem as
well. Support for the independent variables was found, however there was not enough
evidence to support the relationship between political repression and its effect on the
overall democratization movement in Hong Kong.
Further primary research is necessary to address the growing body of literature
and accounts of political repression in Hong Kong. As Robert Dahl said in 1998, free and
fair elections are a cornerstone of a successful democracy. Thus the loss of or inability to
hold free and fair elections can undermine Hong Kong’s democratization movement.
Continued repression in Hong Kong will lead to a de-legitimization of the government,
disillusionment of democratic government, and will overall hurt Hong Kong’s economy.
Although open government and society produces a more productive economy, Hong
Kong business elites have been slow to adopt this notion.
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With a time table for universal suffrage set for the Chief Executive election in
2017, it can only be hoped that Beijing will keep its word and that Hong Kong will be
economically and socially ready. However, Hong Kong, and those watching its political
development, will not have to wait until 2017 to obtain a status report on the status of
democracy there. This September, the LegCo elections are sure to produce data that will
serve as a benchmark for the progress of the democratization process. If the election of
pro-democracy Anson Chan over pro-Beijing candidate Regina Ip last winter is any
indication of things to come, then the pro-democracy parties might find some success this
fall. However, as this study has shown the factors working against democracy in Hong
Kong are powerful and are not likely to diminish in the near future.
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